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HIERARCHY AND DUALISM
IN ARISTOTELIAN PSYCHOLOGY"
GERRIT GLAS
Philosophical antropology and psychology have shown in recent years an
increasing interest in human emotions and emotive life.1 In the light of a
philosophical and cultural tradition of twenty-five centuries, which sought to
define human nature without making any substantial reference, it seems, to
feelings and emotions, this interest is remarkable indeed. The so-called
Platonic-Christian tradition is mostly held responsible for this relative neglect
of the emotional side of the human condition. Present-day writers often
point in this connection to the hierarchical ordering of human functions or
levels of being in the Greek and early Christian view of the human person.
When theoretical or religious contemplation is taken to be the principal and
highest objective of human life, human emotions and physical desires can
only be considered as belonging to a lower order, as a disturbing and
disruptive constituent of human life.
While this commonly held interpretation does raise a key problem of the
ancient and patristic view of human nature and its emotional life—namely, its
hierarchical framework—this interpretation, nevertheless, suffers, I feel,
from one-sidedness.2 Plato, Aristotle and Augustine cannot simply be
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assumed to have rejected emotional behaviour and the expression of feelings
without further ado. Both Plato and Augustine, in fact, wrestled at great length
with the problem of emotion in its widest sense. Platonic theoretical eras
and Augustinian religious commitment cannot be regarded as detached and
dispassioned human activities,3 and Aristotle gave us a rather detailed and
balanced account of the whole scale of emotional phenomena in human
beings. We shall deal with this account in this essay. Rather than discon-
necting the bonds of emotion with moral behaviour, poetry and rhetoric,
Aristotle sought to restore them.
There is still another reason for regarding this prevalent interpretation
with a certain reservation. Contemporary thought has undergone the influ-
ence of Cartesian philosophy and our perception of the Greek view of the
human person may well be coloured by this philosophy. Especially the
concept of emotion has been affected by discussions of mind and body
from a Cartesian point of view. The Greek concept of matter is, for example,
easily mistaken for the Cartesian res extensa, thus rendering the ancient
accounts of emotion as early and inadequate precursors of the modern
physiological theories of emotion which bear the stamp of Descartes. The
scope of modern physiology is, however, considerably narrower than its
ancient counterpart: somatic treatment and moral dictates both belonged in
equal measure to the ancient science of healing. In comparison to Descartes
and his successors, the Greek concept of matter is much broader.4
The Greeks, in turn, had really no concept for consciousness especially in
its reflexive sense of self-consiousness.5 We are inclined to equate emotion
with some kind of self-awareness. Introspection as one of the methods of
examining emotions, shows some resemblance—albeit superficial—to Des-
cartes' experiment that led him in the final analysis to the basic experience of
consciousness as 'I think therefore I am.' The commonly accepted notion of
emotion as primarily a subjective experience is, it seems, closely connected
with the Cartesian concept of consciousness. Must we therefore conclude
that the ancient philosophers could not but disregard emotionality altogether
because they were unacquainted with such a concept of consciousness? A
conclusion of this kind would betray, I believe, a Cartesian bias.
3
 Plato, Symposium, Augustine, Confessions, Bk. 11-13 Cf E.R Dodds, The Greeks and
the Irrational, Berkeley/Los Angelos/London: University of California Press, 1951, pp.
207-235; B. Simon, Mind and Madness in Ancient Greece, Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1978.
4
 In (Neo-)Platonism, the concept of matter denotes that which is chaotic, formless,
impure, evil, in general that which is devoid of being. In Aristotelianism, matter is
synonymous with unqualified and undiflerentiated potentiality, whereas the Cartesian res
extensa refers to that which is visible, solid, impenetrable, infinitely divisible and external
to the mind.
5 Cf. C.H. Kahn, 'Sensation and consciousness in Aristotle's psychology,' in: J. Barnes, M.
Schofield, R. Sorabji, eds., Articles on Aristotle 4. Psychology and Aesthetics, London:
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meaning (receiving information from the outside world) and a subjective meaning (felt
awareness). He thinks that sunatsthèsis (cf. suneidêsis, conscientta) comes closest to
'consciousness' (p 24). This question is also discussed by K.R. Popper and J.C. Eccles, The
Self and la Brain. An Argument for Interacliontsm, Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1977, pp.
151-153.
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A careful study of the ancient theory of human emotion in the context of
the ancient hierarchical models of man is required in order to avoid such a
bias. In this essay I shall address myself to one main question: Can a
hierarchical 'model' of man do justice to human emotions;* I have chosen
Aristotle as the representative of such a hierarchical view, because his oeuvre
presents us with a rather detailed, although not entirely systematic account of
the emotions. In my discussions of Aristotle, I shall for the purpose of
comparison also draw on the dualist theory of Descartes. In the last section
both theories will be examined side by side with the anthropology of
Herman Dooyeweerd. This essay makes no claim to historical detail. It
merely offers a systematic outline of one of the historical landmarks in the
philosophical theory of emotions. My discussion will centre around two pairs
of contrasts: namely, the rational and irrational and the passive and active.
1. Aristotle: General Background
Two problems face anyone who attempts to gain clear insight into Aristotle's
psychology and particularly his view of emotions. First, the corpus Aristo-
telicum does not deal with emotions as a distinct subject matter.7 Aristotle's
views on this subject are scattered throughout his works and are found in
various contexts, as, for example, in a general theory of the soul (De anima)
or in a discussion of ethical or rhetorical matters (Nicomacbean Ethics,
Rhetoric). It is therefore incorrect to speak of one Aristotelian theory of
emotions; there are several and they must not be merged by extrapolating
them out of their separate contexts.
Secondly, there is the moot question of development in Aristotelian
thought, especially with regard to the presumedly extensive lost works.
Franciscus J.CJ.Nuyens distinguished three phases in Aristotle's thinking on
the relationship between soul and body.8 The first is the early Platonic-dualist
phase, followed by a transitional phase in which the body is viewed as a tool
or instrument of the soul. The Nicomachean Ethics he considers to belong to
this instrumental phase.' The final phase is one in which Aristotle develops
his mature doctrine of the substantial unity of body and soul, also designated
as his doctrine of hylomorphism. It is found, for example, in De anima.
Charles Lefèvre, in a thorough analysis on this question of development, has
^ In this contribution I shall make use of two criteria of evaluation. First of all, a theory of
emotion must account in one way or another for the fact that emotions are personal. They
tell us something about a person. In the second place, I shall take the view that the
different functions in human acting are morally and ontologically equivalent to each
other. Other criteria which might be mentioned are of less relevance in the evaluation of
hierarchical 'models ' The question whether Aristotle held a hierarchical or dualist view is
discussed by H. Robinson, 'Aristotelian Dualism,' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy I
(1983), pp. 123-144. M.C. Nussbaum has raised justifiable criticism in: 'Aristotelian
Dualism: A Reply to Howard Robinson,' Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy II (1984),
pp. 197-207.
' Diogenes Laërüus V, 45 makes mention of a treatise Peri Palboon, which presumably
belongs to the extensive lost works of Aristotle. I am grateful to A.P. Bos, who called my
attention to this reference.
8
 F.j.C.J. Nuyens, Ontwikkelingsmomenten in de zielkunde van Aristoteles. Een
historisch-philosophische studie, Nijmegen: Dekker & Van de Vegt, 1939
9
 Ibid., pp 171-176.
offered a critique of Nuyens' interpretation, especially of his distinguishing a
separate middle phase.10 Lefèvre denies the need of this distinction and
shows that the works of this so-called instrumental period bear the marks of
both dualism and hylomorphism. J.Verhaeghe, whose monograph deals with
the concept of man in Aristotle's ethics, even goes so far as to question the
importance of the genetic approach to the corpus.11
I shall concentrate on the works generally attributed to the later phases of
Aristotle's thought, in particular to De anima, Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric
and Politics, My starting point will be the hylomorphism of De anima,
because here we find the hierarchical view of man and living nature in
general. Whereas I agree with Lefèvre that an instrumentalist period cannot
be distinguished from a hylomorphic period, there are differences in scope
and tenor between De anima and works usually attributed to this so-called
instrumentalist period, as Lefèvre has shown meticulously I will first summa-
rize Aristotle's views, leaving open the question whether or not these views
can all be fitted into the general framework of hylomorphism. In the follow-
ing sections I will return to this problem.
In De anima, the soul is equated with life in its most general sense, thus
also the life of plants. Aristotle distinguishes between five levels of func-
tioning in the living part of the cosmos: namely, the functions or faculties of
nutrition (or growth), of sensation, striving, understanding and voluntary
movement.12 This very broad concept of soul, which encompasses life in all
its variation, has been called the 'biological theory.'
This biological theory of the soul differs from the Platonic conception of
the soul worked out in the relatively late dialogues, such as Philebus, Timaeus,
and Laws. In the earlier dialogues, such as the Phaedo (66b-67c), Plato
conceives of the passions as having a purely physical origin As such they
infect the immaterial soul. However, in the later dialogues such passions as
anger and fear and even the bodily drives of hunger and thirst all have their
seat in the soul. Plato locates the middle part of the soul, to which the
passions belong, in the breast, and the lower part, containing the appetites,
in the abdomen ( Timaeus 69c-72d). The theme of pollution is also broached
here, but Plato now thinks of it in terms of a struggle between the different
parts of the soul: the lower parts infecting the higher, rational part of the
soul.
In spite of this remarkable expansion of the concept of soul, the later
Plato still differs in at least three respects from the doctrine of the substantial
unity of soul and body, as developed in De anima. First, Plato speaks of
'parts' where Aristotle prefers to use the notion of 'faculties' of the soul13.
Secondly, these faculties are hierarchically arranged in such a way that the
higher levels govern the lower and that each lower level becomes integrated
in the level above.14 Thirdly, Aristotle regards the soul as the perfection of
10
 C. Lefèvre, Sur l'évolution ä'Aristole en psychologie, Louvain: 1972, ch. 4, in particular
pp 214 -250.
" J. Verhaeghe, Het mensbeeld in de aristotelische ethiek, Brussel, 1980, pp. 17-24.
12
 De anima, 414a 30-415a 14, 433a ÇM35a 10.
» De anima 41 Ib 26, 27; 432b 2,3
M
 De anima 413a-2b 25; 415a 1-12; 434a 23-bll. Aristotle, in fact, elaborated only very
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the body. Corporality is conceived of as matter achieving its highest degree
of actualization in the form, that is, the soul, as the first actuality, imprinting
its emelecheic force on the body.
Plato's and even less Aristotle's view of the soul can hardly be identified
with the Cartesian notion of a thinking substance. The reduction of the
concept of soul to purely mental acts, in the sense of Descartes, is entirely
incompatible with the biological theory of Aristotle. Neither is it in line with
the Stagirite to equate the soul with consciousness and to describe the
activities of the soul as manifestations of mental processes, tempting as that
may be.15 Aristotle is concerned with life in all its forms and not with
consciousness as such."
The hylomorphism of De anima always refers to the formative power of
life in relation to maner (or that which has the first potentiality). This fact
may be illustrated by Aristotle's comments on emotions.17 It is practically
inconceivable that any emotion be devoid of some physical response He
even states that from a physicist's point of view anger is the boiling of blood
around the heart (403a 30-b 2). This statement seems to imply a blatant mate-
rialism. However, as Sorabji has pointed out, Aristotle never intended to state
that anger is identical with the boiling of blood, or warm substance around
the heart. His claim is not that anger is merely a physiological process.18
Aristotle exemplifies his position by comparing anger with a house. The
function of a house cannot be understood in terms of the nature of the
bricks alone. Function and material are governed by their own principles.
They are at the same time both necessary and interdependent. The bricks by
themselves do not add up to a house; they may still be there when the house
is demolished. The function or 'form' of the house, the reason for its having
been constructed—as a shelter, for example—should, on the other hand, not
be taken as one component among the other material components. The
form determines the whole and arranges matter in a meaningful way.
Aristotle does not contradict himself, therefore, when he states that anger
has a corporeal basis (or 'is' corporeal) and that it is determined by a mental
representation or desire, in case of anger, the craving for retaliation in the
face of unwarranted insult (403a 25-b 17).
The doctrine of the substantial unity of body and soul, as the above
example clearly shows, has important consequences for the theory of emo-
tion. If the phenomena of life together constitute a whole, determined by
both matter and form, then emotions cannot be adequately accounted for by
separating them into mental and physical components, as Descartes does.
Emotions are more than the sum total of physiological processes and purely
briefly on the hierarchical interlacements and confined his summary statements to the
lowest levels/faculties.15
 Cf. Kahn, op.cit., pp 22, 23; also R. Sorabji, 'Body and Soul in Aristotle,' in: J. Bames,
M. Schofield, R. Sorabji eds., Articles on Aristotle 4. Psychology ana Aesthetics, London:
Duckworth, 1979, pp 42-64.
16
 Aristotle holds that it is not the soul which feels pity or becomes angry, but man by
means of his soul: De anima 407b 12-16, 1035a 7-10.
17
 De anima 403a 5-25, 407b 24, 408b 10 -15. 23-30.
18
 J. Sorabji, op.ctt., p. 55; cf. Metaphysica 1041b 12-16, 1035a 7-10.
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mental acts. Aristotle distinguishes these constituents not as separate com-
ponents but as material and formal causes: the boiling of the blood around
the heart is the material, the desire to retaliate the formal cause of anger."
2. Aristotle on Emotion: Rational or Irrational.'
Having sketched the basic tenets of Aristotle's theory of emotion, we are
now able to focus on the two contrasts mentioned in the introduction. Are
emotions to be regarded as rational or as irrational? With regard to this first
contrast, the Stagirite discusses at some length the role of mental repre-
sentation (or the mental object) in emotion. In doing so, he takes up a train
of thought which can be traced back to the Philebus of Plato. In this dialogue,
however, the role of mental representation is far from clear; it seems to be
accidental in respect of the other aspects of emotion (37e-38b). Plato leaves,
for example, the question concerning the kind of relation that exists between
the physical sensations and the mental representations unanswered.
Turning now to the other works of Aristotle in which he deals with
emotion, the Rhetoric and the Nicomachean Ethics, these go roughly two
steps beyond the position of the Philebus. First, the mental representation is
taken to be an indispensable element in the concept of (almost every) emo-
tion. Second, particularly the Rhetoric postulates a kind of causal connection
between the representation and the other aspects of emotion. The mental
element is the efficient cause of the corresponding sensations. Thus, anger is
defined as the desire for revenge, accompanied by the pain which follows an
apparent and unjustified insult to oneself or to what belongs to one.20 The
awareness of being humiliated is the cause of becoming angry, just as the
thought of imminent danger is the efficient cause of fear (1382a 21-30).
Moreover, as in De anima, Aristotle also discerns a material and final cause. A
person's state, especially his physical state, constitutes the material cause,
while the object of desire or the end of an action, incited by a particular
emotion is the final cause. As an example of the first, the Rhetoric discusses
the influence of age on a person's emotional life. Old age is said to dispose to
cowardice because of the reduced body temperature (1389b 29). It also
briefly gives an instance of the second: a faint expectation of escape. To fear
means to doubt the possibility of self-defence, it does not mean the con-
viction that no defence is possible.21
It comes as no surprise that in the context of rhetorics the cognitive
aspect turns out to be predominant in the definition of emotion. In order to
persuade his audience the rhetorician seeks to engender the proper
^ De anima 402b 28-403a 17 discerns three perspectives, the perspective of the physicist
studying the material, the technician investigating the composite (sunolon) of form and
matter, and the mathematician/philosopher delineating the form.
20
 Rhetoric 1378a 30-32; cf. Topica 150b 27 151 a 19.
21
 This example illustrates the complexity of emotional phenomena. This complexity
sometimes resists any attempt to fit these phenomena into a conceptual scheme. Fear
does not, it seems, refer to a final goal in its extreme form, because in a situation of com-
plete helplessness there is no future goal. The very impediments to attaining the goal (to
be rescued) seem to play a 'causal' role in the genesis of fear, but these impediments do
not amount to complete helplessness. In a completely helpless situation there is no fear
but only apathy.
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emotional state through the application and contrivance of cognitions, which
constitute the gateway to the corresponding emotions. To do so, he must
have knowledge of the situations, the circumstances and conditions which
correspond with the cognitive contents of emotions and which facilitate
their occurence Perhaps the emphasis on the cognitive aspect is less abso-
lute than it appears and must be understood in the perspective of rhetorics
as the art of verbal persuasion. Aristotle's account of emotions would indeed
not have been as detailed, if he had not believed that this cognitive element
were a constituent of emotions, being even capable of engendering them,
but there is no ground for claiming that the Rhetoric represents 'the cogni-
tive view of emotion.'22 This work, as we have seen, does not neglect the
bodily dispositions and their influence on human emotions
In the Nicomachean Ethics a new dimension is added to what I have called
the cognitive element of emotion: namely, the doctrine of the bipartite
nature of the human soul. This bipartition concerns the distinction between
the logical (or rational) and a-logical (or non-rational) half or element of the
human soul. The former refers to man's capacity to reason and deliberate;
the latter to his capacity to respond to and obey the directives issuing from
the rational principle. Aristotle likens this obedience to the attitude of a child
to its father. The virtues are also distinguished in accordance with this bi-
partition. Thus, theoretical wisdom and practical wisdom, corresponding
with the rational element, are called 'intellectual virtues'; character traits or
dispositions such as temperance and liberality, corresponding with the non-
rational element, are called 'moral' (1102a 24-1103a 10). The latter are closely
connected with the affects of the soul.
However, affects, or passions, are not the same as moral virtues. A person
is not called good or bad on the basis of his passions, but on the basis of his
virtues or vices. Virtues are a matter of choice; passions, such as anger and
fear occur without choice. Choice is an essential element in the concept of
moral virtue. When we experience the passions, we are said to undergo
change. Aristotle summarizes his position when he says that moral virtues are
hexeis of the soul. We are well or ill disposed to the passions (pathe) in
accordance with a bexis, meaning a disposition, a formed habit, a state of
character. Thus, temperance, for example, may be seen as being well dis-
posed with respect to anger and fear. To complete the picture, Aristotle also
distinguishes several faculties (dunameis) of the soul. A dunamis, such as the
capacity to be angry, should also not be confused with the moral virtues,
since it belongs to our nature and hence we cannot be praised or blamed on
account of it.23
22
 Against W. Lyons, op.cit., pp 33-35. For a more refined account of the relation
between emotion and cognition (or judgment), see S.R. Letghton, 'Aristotle and the
Emotions,' Pbnmesis, Vol XXV1I (1982), pp. 144-174.
2
' Nicomachean Ethics 1105b 19-1106a. In the translation of D. Ross (revised by J.L.
Ackril and JO Urmson 1925; 1980) this passage reads "By passions I mean appetite, anger,
fear, confidence, envy, joy, friendly feeling, hatred, longing, emulation, pity, and in general
feelings that are accompanied by pleasure and pain; by faculties (dunameis) the things in
virtue of which we are said to be capable of feeling these, e.g of becoming angry or being
pained or feeling pity; by states of character (bexeis) the things in virtue of which we stand
well or badly with reference to the passions, e.g. with reference to anger we stand badly if
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This piling up of distinctions may, at first sight, seem rather confusing, but
we must realize that Aristotle's primary interest in this work is practical: the
upbringing of children and the ethical preliminaries with regard to polical
activity. Restricting ourselves to the first, the various distinctions contribute
to a rather detailed and realistic picture of education. Although children
possess numerous capacities (dunameis), Aristotle states, they lack as yet any
rational activity. They come into the world without habits (bexeis), but are
susceptible to the various affects (paths) of the soul. These passions must be
moulded and regulated by the educators, if children are to develop into
virtuous persons This moulding strives after stability with regard to the
passions in all kinds of situations, so that its process is complete when it has
resulted in more or less fixed patterns of behaviour, in habits or character
traits called moral virtues. Aristotle stresses that the moral virtues are
acquired through the repetition of the corresponding acts. The virtue of
temperance is acquired through temperate acts. In most cases, such acts are
initially realized through some degree of coercion, through punishment, for
example.2'1
However, the foregoing only represents a part of Aristotle's view on
education. Interesting is Aristotle's suggestion that once the child has grown
up and the rational part has become active, passions may serve as an
indication of the choice that a person must make for what he calls the 'mean'
or 'intermediate' (meson) Thus, virtue is defined as 'a state of character con-
cerned with choice, lying in a mean, i.e. in the mean relative to us...' (1106b
36-1107a 1). The mean avoids both excess and defect in action as well as
passion. Determining the mean at the end of book two of the Nicomachean
Ethics thus, Aristotle adds that it is grasped by perception rather than
(primarily) by reason. Finding the mean is like the act of straightening a
warped piece of wood: we have to drag ourselves away from the extreme to
which our nature tends towards the opposite extreme. The position in which
we find ourselves between the two extremes is to be recognized by the
pleasure or pain which we feel with regard to them.25 The passions therefore
not only are influenced by the habits which we acquire; they also serve to
provide us with signals as to the acceptable behaviour and the moral atti-
tudes. According to this work then, these signals occur on the level of sense
perception. In contemporary terms, we might call a passion a kind of pre-
reflexive awareness, combined with a tendency toward action in one direc-
tion or another
Our discussion of Rhetoric and Nicomachean Ethics centered around the
contrast between the rational and the irrational With regard to this contrast
we can conclude that the Stagirite locates emotion in the non-rational or
we feel it violently or too weakly, and well if we feel it moderately; ."
M
 In the quoted passages, Aristotle makes use of a medical analogy. Punishment is a kind
of cure; il belongs to the nature of cures to be effected by contraries (1104b 11). As private
education has an advantage over public education so also private medical treatment is to
be preferred to public (1180b 8)
25
 This signalling fucu'on of emotion does not take away the important role of practical
wisdom, which in the first place is concerned with the choice of the nght means, but is
also (just as emotion/moral virtue) involved in the choice of the moral end of one's
actions (Book III, 4 and book VI. 12, 1J).
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alogical part of the soul along with the moral virtues. This location does not
imply that human emotions are devoid of meaning or even that they are to
be equated with the blind habits or disruptive impulses of animal behaviour.
Aristotle is arguing within the framework of bipartition of the soul, which is
an exclusively human model of the soul.26 Although the non-rational half of
the human soul is of itself incapable of reasoning and deliberating, it is
receptive to the guidance of the logos and can obey its rules. Moreover, our
discussion of the relation between moral virtue and passion has shown that
pleasure and pain sometimes obtain an important evaluative and signalling
function in the acquisition of the right moral attitude Hence, we may con-
clude that human emotions are more than mere (animal) reflexes. Although
they are not instances of logical calculation,27 they are still marked by a kind
of discriminative awareness which might be described as the non-reflective
evaluation of situations, accompanied by a tendency to move from or
towards something. This tendency is then determined by the emotion in
question.
Because human emotions are receptive to the guidance of reason,
Aristotle is able to explain the effects of verbal persuasion partly in terms of
bringing about the right emotional state in the audience. The mental images
which the speaker elicits through his rhetorical art is the efficient cause of the
corresponding emotions. This manner of bringing about an emotional state
is the not only one; other means can be applied to influence the course and
intensity of emotional life.28 Education appears to be the most decisive.2'
Here, too, the argument runs parallel The external coercion, which is often
needed, does not necessarily lead to the formation of a set of blind habits.
Most people, of course, have natural and acquired inclinations and attitudes
which are more or less rigid, but which take on a new shape in every new
situation by a kind of dialogue between moral virtue, practical wisdom
(which belongs to the rational 'half) and emotional responses.30
Our discussion raises some fundamental questions which remain to be
answered. Does not the doctrine of the bipartite soul contradict, or at least
26
 This point is stressed by W W. Fortenbaugh, Aristotle on Emotion A Contribution to
Philosophical Psychology, Rhetoric, Poetics, Politics and Ethics, London: Duckworth,
1975, ch. 2, for example, p. 23: "Once emotions were focussed upon and recognized as a
special class of cognitive phenomena open to reasoned persuasion in a way lhat bodily
drives are not, il was possible to develop a peculiarly human psychology which could
replace Plato's tripartite psychology " In my view, Fortenbaugh goes too far in his
emphasis on the cognitive status of emotions
27
 Corresponding remarks are made about smell. De anima 424b 3-18.
28
 For example, gymnastics, poetry, tragedy, music, education. 1 shall not enter into the
heated discussion of the interpretation of the term catharsis and of the cathartic effect of
tragedy (Politics 1342a 1-16, Poetics 1449b 22-28). Cf C.W. Boekel, Katharsis. Een filolo-
gische reconstructie van de psychologie van Aristoteles omtrent het gevoelsleven. Utrecht:
De Fontein, 1957, pp. 172-176, 21011.
29
 Education is not restricted to intellectual learning, but involves exercise and training.
Courage is not a result of talking about it. The quality of one's emotional and moral
responses is evidenced in unexpected situations, which do not permit rational delibera-
tion. Cf W.W. Fortenbaugh, op.ctt-, pp 70-75, on 'sudden alarm '
30
 Nicomacbean Ethics 1143b l&-1145a 11. Practical wisdom (pbronèsis) is compared to
the eye, which makes it possible for the body, which without sight might stumble, to walk
straight Cf. also 1178a7ff.
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disagree with, the theory of hylomorphism as presented in De animée Does
not this bipartition represent a relapse into the dualist division of the soul
into two 'parts? Moreover, do not the nutritive and sensitive faculties of the
soul fall outside the scope of the bipartite soul? With regard to this last
question, Fortenbaugh has suggested that the bipartite model should be
viewed exclusively as a cognitive theory in which, for example, considera-
tions of the appetites as originating within the body have no place. He strictly
separates the cognitive psychology of the Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric and
Politics from the biological theory of De animo.31 This interpretation meets
serious difficulties in the crucial passage of Nicomachean Ethics 1102a 25-
1103a 3, in which Aristotle makes explicit mention of the appetites when he
describes the non-rational part of the soul32 Elsewhere in the same treatise
G178a 15) he even suggests that moral virtue may have a physical origin.
Moreover, Fortenbaugh remains rather vague in delineating the meaning of
the adjective 'cognitive.' He does not discuss the role of sense-perception
and the importance of imagination for emotions. Cognition appears to be a
narrower concept lying somewhere between a proposition and a belief.'3
It must be acknowledged, however, that the bipartite psychology of the
Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetorics and Politics^4 comes fairly close to an instru-
mentalist conception of the relationship between body and soul, in that the
bipartite human soul, although closely connected with the body, is depicted
as a unity in itself, i.e., a unity consisting of two parts. The question is raised
again, therefore, as to whether or not a gap exists between the instrumen-
talist claim of bipartition and the integrative view of hylomorphism. I realize
that a conclusive and comprehensive answer to this question exceeds the
scope of the present discussion, but Lefèvre gives us solid support in his
detailed and scholarly treatise on Aristotelian psychology.351 shall sum up the
31
 Fortenbagh mentions, in summary, the following arguments: a) adherents lo the idea
of the compatibility of the biological with the political-ethical (cognitive) theory, wrongly
assume that the aiogical part of Aristotle's psychology has issued from joining the two
lower paris of Plato's tripartite psychology, i.e. the affective and the appetitive parts (<*«-
moetdes and epitbumetikon, respectively), Plato tied the epitbumetikon more strongly to
bodily drives than Aristotle, whereas Plato discerns a desiderauve element in each of the
three soul-parts, Aristotle groups all desiderative capacities together, including rational
volition (boulests), in the aiogical part of the soul (p. 31-35); b) the biological theory
cannot locate' emotion, because emotions involve aspects of the nous, orexis and ais-
tbesis (p. 27, n. 1); c) biological and bipartite/ cognitive theory both presuppose entirely
different frameworks, the biological theory being directed towards living nature in general
and bipartite psychology exclusively to man. Fortenbaugh has been criticized by A.C.
Uoyd, Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 58(1976), pp 268-271. Cf. also P.A. Vander
Waerdt, 'The peripatetic interpretation of Plato's tripartite psychology,' Greek, Roman
and Byzantine Studies 26(1985), pp. 283-302
32
 In 1097b 33-1098a 3, both the biological theory and the bipartite psychology are
brought together. Indeed, this passage makes clear that the bipartite model refers exclu-
sively lo human psychology Aristotle suggests, however, that the biological theory refers
to functions (or ontological structures) and bipartite psychology to funct\oning (moral
acting), cf. 1098a 3-17. If Ihis interpretation is valid, then the one viewpoint does not
exclude the other, as Fortenbaugh seems to suggest.
3J
 Cf. Uoyd, op cit., p. 270.
4
 Politics 1333a l6ff., 1334b 6-28. Pmtrepticus fragment 11 also refers to bipartition.
35
 C. Lefèvre, Sur l'évolution d'Aristote en psychologie This book also offers a scholarly
criticism of the monumental commentary on Nicomachean Ethics by Gauthier and Jolif.
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main conclusions of his study insofar as these are relevant in the present
discussion, leaving aside the dose argumentation of his investigations for the
sake of brevity.
In the first place, both conceptions, that of instrumentalism as well as that
of the soul's bipartition, can be found in the early works (such as Protrep-
ticus) and in the later works (such as De anima). There is consequently no
reason for postulating a distinct, instrumentalist middle-phase. Even De
anima does not on closer inspection appear to be entirely consistent in its
doctrine of hylomorphism.36 In the second place, hylomorphism is not
really absent in the other works. It seems to be rather presupposed in them.
In the discussion with Fortenbaugh this came out with regard to the
Nicomachean Ethics Book I, cap. 7 and 13 In the third place, the ethical (and
political) works admittedly offer a more restricted and rougher model of the
soul compared to De anima, but the lack of psychological detail in them is
due to the simply fact that their subject matter is different. Aristotle has no
need of more refinement with regard to ethics and politics, so that, accord-
ing to Lefèvre, these different perspectives should be explained in terms of
Aristotle's different pedagogical aims These perspectives are not mutually
exclusive, in spite of their difference in emphasis and structure.37
In conclusion, De anima offers a general background by showing that man
is a living creature among other living creatures (plants and animals). Whether
or not it is wholly consistent in fulfilling the aim of providing a general and
comprehensive theory of the hierarchically ordered, living cosmos, remains
a moot question. The ethical, political and rhetorical works restrict them-
selves to man as an ethical, political and social being. They deal with human
psychology only to the extent that it is relevant to the subject at hand.
As was indicated above, the bipartition conception only holds for the
human soul; Aristotle never lost sight of the exceptional position of man in
the earthly cosmos. It is worth adding that this point of view, as I will show at
the end of this paper, is found in a more pronounced form in De anima, in
the passage on the separate intellectual soul (429a 10-29, 430a 10-25).38
3. Aristotle on Emotion: Passive or Active?
Some of the material relevant for the question which must now be raised—
are emotions passive or active?—has been presented in the discussion
Cf. also C Lefèvre, 'Une nouvelle introduction à l'Ethique à Nicomaque,' Revue de
Philosophie de louvatn, (1973), pp 641-659.
^ De anima 415b 20 calls 'natural bodies, plants as well as animals, organs of the soul.'
Cf the much discussed reference to Plato. 41 äa 8-9.
37
 C Lefèvre, Sur l'évolution, pp. 221-234, 281-287. He opts for "une conciliation
'pédagogique'" (p. 230ff). Leighton, op cit., draws a similar conclusion with regard to the
different definitions of pathê in Rhetoric, Mcomacbean Ethics and De anima.
38
 Ibidem, pp 235-242. Concerning U78a 19-22: "Being connected with the passions
also, the moral virtues must belong to our composite nature; and the virtues of our com-
posite nature are human; ... The excellence of the reason is a thing apart..." (translation of
Ross), Lefèvre remarks: "Mais, aux tenants d'une concordance avec le De anima, nous
devons faire remarquer qu'il paraît impossible de comprendre le texte comme s'il y avait
nous cbooristos- c'est le bonheur de l'esprit ... qui est dit 'séparé', c'est à dire ... caractérisé
par une réelle autonomie" (p. 240). In other words, this passage refers to the moral
excellence of human reason, not to the separate intellect (nous chooristoi) of De anima.
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above Before dealing with this question directly, however, we must keep in
mind that the metaphysical concept of 'pathë is much broader than the
concept of 'patbè of the soul,' and that the latter is broader than the concept
of emotion. Patbè, in general, are related to the changes which happen to a
thing and which have an external cause.59 They are accidental to a thing and as
such stand in contrast to a thing's nature or essence, which is its principle of
motion. Strictly speaking, they do not bring about a modification of the
substances of things Pathè may, however, interrupt the activity of a thing
Their impact may also lead to the formation of dispositions, which influence
the course of particular activities. Inversely, the consequences of an agent's
activity sometimes 'affect' that agent, be it a person or a thing However,
these refinements do not alter the basic principle: the essence of a thing is its
(natural) activity which cannot be affected by accidental and external circum-
stances (pathë), not even when they bring about permanent change.
Generally speaking, Aristotle maintains this position in his anthropology and
psychology. Discussing the nature and essence of the human being, he
invariably points to the intellect (nous poietikos), that is, the pure activity of
contemplation.40 Pure intellect does not contain anything of the body;41 it is
insensible to affections and impressions, it is unmixed, that is, it knows only
itself. In this way, the pure intellect (nous or nous poietikos) is separated in
some sense from the human soul (psyche). At some places this separation is
masked by conceiving both as parts of an encompassing soul However,
even there Aristotle remains constant in his assumption that there is a pan of
the soul which remains untouched by sensory impressions and other bodily
influences.
This metaphysical doctrine of the intellectus agens might lead one to
suspect that emotions are to be described as states of mind which are merely
passive, accidental and aroused by some external cause However, they are
nothing of the kind. We encounter in Aristotelian psychology the remark-
able state of affairs that the patbè of the soul are enlisted in the striving after
the moral good and that they posses as such the element of intentional
action As the preceding discussion of moral virtues demonstrated, passions
are included in the full description of man's virtuous activities. When pro-
perly channelled, they provide the basis for a life of happy contemplation.
There seems to be, therefore, a disparity between the general view of patbè
39
 Metaphysics 1022b ff, Catégorise 9a 28-10a 11, lib 1-llb 18, Physics 202a 21ff Cf. A.
Oksenberg Rorty, 'Aristotle on the metaphysical status of patbe,' Review of Metaphysics
38(1»«, 521-546
40
 Metaphysics 1075b 21 24, De anima 429a 15. 19, 24-29, 429b 5, 430a 16-18, 22-25, 430b
24, 25; Nicomachean Ethics bk. X, ch 7, 8.
41
 De anima 431a 16, 432a 7-14 For an adequate account of the difference between nous
and psyche, the theme of cosmos and microcosmos must be taken into consideration.
Presumably Aristotle assumed the existence of a fifth element (quinta natura, i.e.. ether)
as the substance of the soul- The active intellect, then, should be conceived as ihe
immaterial centre of a surrounding nebula (ether), analogous to the earth and the heaven-
ly bodies. Cf. C. Lefèvre, 'Quinta natura et psychologie aristotélicienne,' Revue de philo-
sophie de Louvatn 690971), 5-43; A P. Bos, 'Aristotle's Eudemus and Protrepticus: are they
really two different works?' Dlonystos, 30984), 19-51; A P. Bos, 'Aristotle on myth and
philosophy,' Phllosophta reformata 48(1983), 1-18; AP. Bos, 'Het grondmotief vin de
Griekse cultuur en hel titanische zinperspeküef,' Phitosophia reformata, 51(1986), 117-137.
HIERARCHY AND DUALISM 107
as being accidental and prompted by some external cause, on the one hand,
and paths of the soul as being incorporated in an intentional action, on the
other hand.
This disparity, however, is more apparent than real when it is approached
from another point of view. Aristotle wants to safeguard above all the
separateness of that which he considers to be the essence of man, namely:
his intellect. Given the separateness of the nous and making the transition to
the theory of the mixed soul, it turns out that there is scope for connecting
pathè with action This would obviously not be the case if nous and psyche
were more closely tied together. When Aristotle argues for the separateness
of the nous, he seems to imply that, no matter how strong the impact of the
emotrons on man's soul (.psyché), they would not alter the inner nature and
ultimate destiny of man, which goes far beyond the life of the mixed soul.42
According to this interpretation, it is the chasm between nous and psyche
which is responsible for the disparity between metaphysical and psycho-
logical pathè. And paradoxically, it is this tendency to metaphysical dualism
which guarantees the unification of concepts in psychology.
Aside from these theoretical concerns, Aristotle also offers more practical
reasons for emphasizing the strong connection between emotion and moral
responsibility. Passions by themselves do not involve choice, but Aristotle
seems to suggest that it is somewhat artificial to speak of passions by them-
selves. They often are part of an intentional act. For example, when someone
revenges himself, the feeling of anger accompanies, intensifies, or perhaps
even gives rise to the act of revenge. Or, to use another example, habits are
acquired through the encouragement and punishment of an external, authori-
tative agent We learn to be steadfast in frightening circumstances withough
losing sight of the inherent risks. Habits regulate passions as well as actions.43
As we have observed, passions may in turn influence the choice and direc-
tion of one's moral actions. The strong connections between moral virtue
and passion thus show how activity and passivity are intertwined.
Perhaps a further step jnay be made by suggesting that in the Aristotelian
ethics the merely passive qualities of the passions are to be conquered by
some kind of active principle. This active principle is embodied in good
habits (the moral virtues) which are moulded by external rational control, in
the first place, and are then in the second place internalized. It is the faculty
of practical reasoning which in the final analysis leads to the perfection of
both moral virtue and passion and commonly guides our action.44 Viewed
42
 Lefèvre also calls it a paradox: the integrative tendency of hylomorphism, with its
ideological-hierarchical order, conjures up its echec, the problem of the separate intellect
(.Sur l'évolution, p. 287).43
 Nicomacbean Ethics l lOéb 14-27
44
 Besides the fact that practical reason belongs to the logical 'pan' of the bipartite soul
and moral virtue to the alogical 'pan', there is another difference between these two.
Moral virtues ensures a correct goal, whilst practical reason is responsible for proper
means-end deliberations In the mean lime, although most of Ihe emotions are, in some
way, 'practical' in the sense of involving a possible goal for one's actions, there are some
non-practical emotions, such as shame, indignation and pity. Cf. Fortenbaugh, op.ctt., pp.
81-S3, who also suggests that the orientation of emotions to practical goals might explain
why the Greeks knew no moral virtue corresponding to the Christian view of mercy.
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within the framework of Aristotelian ethics, therefore, it would be fruitless to
attempt to isolate passions from the context of action within which they
occur.
The definition of emotions in the Rhetoric confirms this contextuality. One
of the elements in the definition there appears to be the final cause of an
emotion. This finality means the drive towards some end: as, for example, in
anger someone feels the desire to revenge oneself for the insult suffered
(1378a, b). Aristotle goes even further when he adds that, since desires by
their very nature are such that they aim at pleasure, the anticipated act of
revenge must be within reach. How else could we expect a feeling of satis-
faction if the anticipated end of our action would be beyond our reach?
Hence, the tendency to act towards a particular goal must at the very least be
enclosed in the definition of emotion and this enclosement, in turn, shows
how closely activity and passivity are intertwined with regard to emotions.
Incidentally, analogous arguments for this fusing of activity and passivity
may be found. For example, in De anima it is said of sense-perception
(aistbèsis) that it is both kinestbai (being moved), paschein (being acted
upon) and energein (acting).45 Sense-perception, such as seeing, involves
change but is more than just 'being affected' by something. In the act of
seeing potentiality becomes actuality—the changed eye-stuff is transformed
into an (active) sense-organ.46
In summary, pathè are, according to the general, metaphysical concep-
tion, accidental and exogenous; according to the psychological conception,
however, they are assimilated in man's intentional activities, whether they are
conceived of as emotions or, in a wider sense, as 'affections.' This puzzling
disparity may be clarified,
1) by pointing out that the separate nous has a particular status with regard to
the composite soul; and
2) by emphasizing the practical aims of Aristotelian ethics and rhetorics. The
treatises on these subjects suggest that in relation to moral activity and social
life, it is neither realistic nor fruitful to distinguish sharply between passive
states and purposeful acts.
Finally, with regard to pathè in the more restricted sense of emotion, the
interaction of activity and passivity finds confirmation in the close connec-
tion between pathè and orexis (striving). The final paragraphs of the third
chapter of De anima gives a detailed account of the soul as 'being-in-move-
ment.' There are two principles of movement which belong to the soul itself,
namely: orexis and nous combined with imagination.47 A certain order may
be discernible here: appetites strive after a particular end and this end, in
turn, forms the starting point of practical deliberation.48 The capacity to
f> Deanlma4l6b 32-35, 417a 15-Jfl8a 7, 424b 2-19.
46
 Cf. A Oksenberg Rorty, op.ell, pp. 530-31 Cf. R. Sorabji, op.cit., p. 49 comparing
Aristotle with Descartes.
47
 De anima 433a 9-20 The soul as form of the body, i.e , as that after which the body
strives. As a principle of teleology, the soul is characterized in three ways in relation to
movement: it is the principle of movement, the end of movement and also the cause or
substantial form of animated bodies (415b lOff., b 21, 22).
48
 Practical deliberation, as will be remembered (see note 44), seeks for the means to a
particular end, as is stated in Nicomachean Ethics Bk VI, ch. 12, 13.
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press towards a goal seems to be fundamental in relation to movement.49
There is a striving element in every part of the soul (432b 7). What appears to
be relevant to the subject at hand is that striving is closely connected with the
appetites, some of which originate in the body (432b 29-4333 3, 435b 5-13,
434a 13-16). The bodily 'component' may even be decisive as far as the
fulfillment of desire in action may be concerned (432b 31—433a 2). It goes
without saying that emotions are closely tied up with appetites, corporeal or
otherwise. The Nicomachean Ethics (1045b 20ff.) refers to 'appetites ... and
in general the feelings that are accompanied by pleasure or pain' as examples
of passions. Appetite is clearly included in the definition of passion here. De
anima, of course, also prescribes that the sensitive appetites ought to be
controlled by rational volition (practical reason) but this does not preclude
the appetites from being tied up with one of the two principles of move-
ment of the soul, namely: orexis. When the latter is considered to be one of
the origins of the soul's motion and action, and when emotion is associated
with orexis, then there is no reason for regarding the emotions as accidental
and exogenous changes, not affecting the essence of the soul, human or
otherwise 5°
4. Aristotle's Account of Emotion: an Evaluation
Going back over Aristotle's contribution to a philosophical theory of emo-
tion, we face ambiguities on several points. First, he seems, on the one hand,
to consider emotions to be truly human phenomena, enlisted in the striving
for the moral good. On the other hand, emotions take no part in the excel-
lence of the human being; at most they prepare the human person for the
blessed life of contemplation. Secondly, if we begin with the hierarchical
view of De anima we would expect Aristotle to attempt to 'locate' the several
aspects of emotions—the corporeal, the cognitive and the conative—on the
corresponding levels of functioning. But in this work as well as in others, the
intertwinement and interaction of the different levels of the hierarchical
order of faculties are hardly discussed.
This lack of structural intertwinement can also be illustrated from another
perspective. A comparison between human and animal emotional life would
have been consistent with the doctrine of the soul in terms of hylomor-
phism. Human emotions are open to and guided by (rational) habits and
practical reason, while animal emotions are not. This openness and guidance
explains the difference between the two. While animals may be said to 'learn'
from experience, they lack rational control. With regard to the corporeal
and, to a certain extent, the conative aspects of emotion, man and animals
show notable resemblances. Aristotle, however, hardly touches on this sub-
ject. Hence, it seems, hylomorphism serves only as a rough and ready means
"*
9
 The formulations are not, at first sight, completely compatible; 433a 22 mentions 'the
desirable object' and 433a 32 points to the striving capacity as the 'cause' of movement.
Cf. 433b llff. , however, where Aristotle distinguishes between a) the principle of movement
(consisting, in its turn, of an unmoved and a self-moved mover, i.e., the practical and
striving capacities respectively), b) the organ of movement and c) that which is moved.
50
 Cf. De anima 408b 1-32. On the peculiar status of the nous in this context, see 408a 16,
17.
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of classifying plants, (higher and lower) animals and man But the different
phenomena which pertain to each of these in their respective ways are not
distinguished.
Still, if one were to think a little further along these lines, one might well
argue that even when the capacity to think is poorly developed in some
people, as Aristotle, for example, supposes in the case of slaves and bar-
barians, one would still have to maintain a distinct difference between the
emotions of such people and the emotions of animals. The difference may
well be accurately formulated by saying that man is capable of acting, animals
merely of reacting. However, Aristotle fails to draw this conclusion explicitly.
This failure points to a fundamental problem in any theory of emotion and in
Aristotle's hylomorphistic theory in particular: namely, to what extent does
the theory of emotion, be it hierarchical or otherwise, account for the fact
that human emotions reflect in one way or another the unique personality of
an individual? Or, when the assumption of the personal character of (human)
emotion is rejected, how can a split between the human and non-human
'parts' or functions of the human soul be avoided. In the case of Aristotle,
such a split inevitably threatens the very unitary character of his (psycho-
logical) doctrine of the soul.
Restricting myself to Aristotle, I believe there are two main reasons that
explain the presence of ambiguities in his view of emotion. One is that he
failed to carry the program of hylomorphism through with sufficient con-
sistency to avoid them. By hylomorphism I mean the hierarchical ordering
of the soul's faculties of functions, instead of an ordering of 'substances' or
'parts.' Above we saw that very little attention is paid to the intertwinement
and interaction of the various levels; each level seems to possess a relative
independency with respect to the other levels. Sometimes the different
levels appear to be substantialized, at least, to a certain degree.51 This particu-
lar lack of consistency is confirmed by the (well-nigh) separate existence of
the (contemplative) nous. The conception of nous as pure activity, detached
from bodily influences and sensory impressions, cannot be adequately
accounted for within the framework of hylomorphism.
The second reason that may explain the presence of ambiguities in
Aristotle's theory of emotion concerns the problem of the one and the
many, a problem common to every hierarchical theory. Is the unity to which
the many levels or functions refer outside of the hierarchical order or within
it as one of the higher or lower functions or levels? In my estimation
elements of both sides can be found in Aristotle's anthropology. If the unity
is found outside of the hierarchical order, then the question arises: can
hylomorphism still be considered the encompassing theory for the living
cosmos, as Aristotle intended it to be? His conception of the nous, standing,
as it were, with one leg outside of the hylomorphic framework, and, at the
same time, serving as a point of reference, raises the same problem. Sup-
pose that the nous is the principle of unity which the defines the essence of
human nature: in which way are the distinct levels of functioning connected
51
 This subsiantializauon is appâtent, for example, in those passages of De anima with
instrumental overtones, cf note 36.
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with this unifying (and we may add: humanizing) principle? I touched on this
question when discussing human and animal emotion. Aristotle fails to clarify
the difference and he does not make clear why a person's emotions tell us
something about that person.
However, traces of the second solution can also be found. The principle of
unity is then identified with one of the levels of functioning. Here again it is
the nous which fills the bill. It is now conceived of as the highest level of
functioning, and as such it is placed in within the framework of hylomor-
phism in which it serves as a point of reference. This solution, however,
implies a scheme of higher and lower functions, in such a way that 'higher'
means 'more human' and 'lower' means 'less human.' Aristotle's view of
slaves, barbarians and women as being ruled by the passions betrays this
perspective.52
Especially the double role of the nous must be considered as the source of
the ambiguities in Aristotle's theory of emotions. On the one hand, the
activity of the nous is separated almost entirely from the activities of the
psyche. The exclusive position of the intellectus agens threatens the unitary
character of hylomorphism. On the other hand, when the nous is taken as
the highest function of the psyche and as a point of reference for the other
psychic functions, it results in a scheme of higher and lower functions which
has somewhat elitanan implications.
Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to have a clear sense of the connection
between the idea of personal awareness and the problem of the one and the
many In the discussion of sense-experience in De anima, he raises two
questions: first, does each of the different senses (seeing, hearing, smelling,
tasting and touching) have the capacity to be aware that it is sensing separate-
ly, or is this capacity something that is common to all the senses together?
Secondly, how is the capacity to differentiate between the distinct kinds of
sensations to be accounted for' When an object is seen and heard at the
same time, the sensation of seeing can be distinguished from the sensation of
hearing (426b 12-427a 14). Comparing this passage of De anima with the
discussion of the same subject in Parva naturalia, there is only one possible
conclusion, and that is that Aristotle distinguished a common sense-organ
(known in scholastic philosophy as sensus communis) which accompanies
the functioning of all the five senses. Careful study reveals that the meaning of
this concept of a common sense-organ (or perception proper) comes dose
to the modern notion of consciousness, at least taken in an elementary, non-
reflective manner.53 This immediate (self-)awareness fades away during sleep.
52 This natural superiority of reason and intellect is also defended from the viewpoint of
bipartition. Cf Politics, VII, 14, 15.
5
* Cf. Parva naturalia 449a 5-20; 455a 12ff: "Each sense possesses something which is
special and which is common. Special to vision, for example, is seeing, special to the
auditory sense is hearing, and similarly to each of the others; but there is also a common
power which accompanies them all, in virtue of which one perceives, chat one is seeing
and hearing .." This central faculty with its functions of recognition and discrimination,
also serves perhaps as an organ of 'internal sense ' The treatise On memory mentions
three functions: the sense of time, the faculty of image-formation, and memory. Cf. Kahn,
op.ctt, p. 14, 15. Kahn maintains that Aristotle's sensus communis differs considerably
from Cartesian consciousness (cf note 5). His main arguments are that 'perception
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Aristotle States that the perception of differences between the distinctive
sense-organs cannot be explained from the fact that 'I hear' and at the same
time someone else sees. To distinguish them, both kinds of sensation must
be present in one faculty of awareness. In this way, the five distinctive sense-
organs converge into a general capacity of awareness.
It is interesting to note at this juncture that this area of convergence seems
to be equated with an elementary awareness of personal identity. By the very
fact that / am aware of the differences between the distinct kinds of sensa-
tion, we must agree that there are differences in sensation ^
5. Discussion
The significance of Aristotle's doctrine of the soul can hardly be over-
estimated, in spite of the ambiguities and uncertainties with which it leaves us
regarding the theory of human emotion. Aristotelianism raised the basic
questions and provided the conceptual framework for every theory of
emotion for many centuries and at any rate until the age of the Enlighten-
ment. Philosophical anthropology often balanced on the edge of hierarchical
and dualist conceptions. The basic distinctions between appetite, rational
volition and reason, action and passion have set their stamp on the perennial
discussions. In particular, the association of the essence of things and living
creatures with their activity and perfection, has left deep traces in Western
thinking. Following Aristotle, passion could only be conceived of as
'something-to-be-filled-with-action.'55
The whole discussion surrounding the interpretation of the Aristotelian
nous was not at all closed at the end of the Middle Ages. The interpretation
which insisted on the existence of a separate nous also favoured the rise of
medical physiology. It is likely that Arab medical literature, stamped by the
monopsychist interpretation of Aristotle (transcendent and supra-individual
spirit), dominated and enriched the naturalist thinking of the famous school
of Padua, which enhanced the study of anatomy and physiology, including the
physiology of emotions, to new heights.56
proper' (the sensation of sensation) cannot be equated with the Cartesian res cogitans,
which denotes primarily rational thought, and that according to the Aristotelian view, man
and animal (higher animals) have this faculty in common; cf. 23 ff.
^ Cf. De anima 426b 20; if one accepts the view that the immediale self-awareness of the
central faculty characterizes the human person as an animal, that is, as a sentient being,
then there is an important conclusion, drawn explicitly by Kahn (qp.clf., p 30) "... there is
for Aristotle an important distinction which the traditional concept of consciousness
tends to ignore, between the intellectual activity as such and our personal awareness of it.
In Aristotle's view, our personal consciousness as men belongs essentially to our sentient,
animal nature." There appears to be a fundamental distinction between noetic and
sensory awareness Noetic self-awareness is the prerogative of the gods.
55 Hillman, op CU, p 163: Tn one respect—emotions can ultimately be traced to a root
concept of not-being." Hillmann refers, among others, to Heidegger's concept of 'Angst
closely connected with the idea of 'das Nichts' and to Freud's concept of unconscious-
ness—anxiety serving as a signal of the hidden (non-existent) existence of the uncon-
sciousness.
56
 Cf. G. Verwey, Psychiatry In an Anthropological and Biomédical Context. Philoso-
phical Presuppositions and Implications of German Psychiatry 1820-1870, Dordrecht:
Reidel, 1985, pp. 9-34 (p 21 in particular). Verwey even states that the debates between the
so-called 'physicists' and 'somaticists' in the early nineteenth century can be traced back
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In the works of Descartes both the break with the Aristotelian (Scholastic)
tradition and the indebtedness to it becomes clear.'7 His definition of emo-
tion in Les passions de l'âme shows this dramatically. Emotions are divided
into components and these reflect Aristotelian distinctions. Emotions are
defined as passions of the soul and actions of the body. As bodily actions
passions incite the will to do the things for which they prepare the body. As
passions of the soul they must be understood as perceptions by means of
which the soul is related to itself.58 Notwithstanding the real interaction
between soul and body, the scientific concepts of action and passion must
be held strictly separated As Riese states in a work on medical thought in the
17th century, passions are thought to belong to two distinct orders: namely,
to the medical and the moral. In medicine they are treated as pathological
symptoms and in ethics they are conceived of as vices.59
Finally, our discussion of Aristotelian psychology gives rise to a question
regarding Herman Dooyeweerd's anthropology. Dooyeweerd strongly resists
both dualism and the Aristotelian-Scholastic doctrine of substance. Decisive
in this regard is his idea of the concentric directedness of all aspects of the
cosmic time order to the supra-temporal I-ness and to the origin of meaning.
Man's uniqueness, his spirituality, should not be sought for in one of the
higher levels of existence In other words, this uniqueness is not restricted to
one of these higher levels.60 Nor must this uniqueness be separated from
man's 'natural' life. However, I do question whether Dooyeweerd has suffi-
ciently integrated the idea of the concentric directedness of the human I-ness
in the theory of the enkaptic structural whole
This ingeneous theory, which, among other things, forms the basis of
Dooyeweerd's anthropology, he developed as an alternative to the (Neo-)
Scholastic philosophy and to what he calls the 'aggregate theories.'6' The
former neglects the sphere-sovereignty of the substructures of the enkaptic
whole, while the latter tends to substantialize the consument parts without
integrating them into a real unity. Dooyeweerd states that the different indivi-
duality-structures are nof simply intertwined, but that the inter-structural
interlacements are 'realized in one and the same typically qualified form-
to the different philosophical anthropological positions of Plalonism, respectively Aristo-
telianism.
57
 Stoic and Galenic influences on Descartes should also be mentioned.
58
 Rene Descartes, Les passions de l'âme, articles 25, 27, 40, 47 He rejects the partition of
the soul; cf article 68. Cf. also my 'Descarïes over emoties. Het spontane en het instrumen-
tale lichaam in de cartesiaanse antropologie', Pbilosopbia Reformata, 54 (1989), 4-28.
5
' W. Riese, La théorie des passions à la lumière de la pensée médicale du XVII siècle,
Bale (Suisse) éditions S. Karger, 1965, p. 72.
60
 WJ Ouweneel, however, tends to restrict 'spirituality' to the act-structure and calls it
the spiritive structure See his De leer van de mens. proeve van een cbristettjk-wijsgerige
antropologie, Amsterdam: Buijten & Schipperheijn, 1984, p 185IÏ. For my criticism of this
work see my article, 'Psychology als empirische antropologie,' Radix 11(1985), 229-241
This restriction, in my view, leads to the unintended consequence of connecting the idea
of human I-ness more closely to the higher than to the lower functions and individuality-
structures. Ouweneel's Psychologie Ben christelijke kijk op het mentale leven (Amster-
dam: Buijten en Schipperheijn, 1984) shows this unintended consequence clearly in
relation to psychotherapy: with respect to different problems (i.e. modal levels) there are
differences in closeness to the supra-temporal heart (p. 336).
61
 H Dooyeweerd, A New Critique of Theoretical Thought, Vol. Ill, pp. 767-771.
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totality embracing all the interwoven structures in a real enkaptic unity ...'*2 It
is significant that this 'form-totality' does not automatically coincide with the
(qualifying function of the) highest individuality-structure.63 It is sometimes
described as a foundational layer. In the case of man, it is the form of the
body which morphologically binds the four individuality-structures (the
physical, biotic and psychic individuality structures and the act structure).*1
My criticism of Dooyeweerd's doctrine of the enkaptic structural whole in
its application to anthropology concerns the determining role which the
highest individuality-structure, that is, the act-structure, plays in defining the
body as a human body. Only because the first three substructures are bound
up within the fourth act-structure they can form an essential part of the
human body or can be called 'human' at all.65 Dooyeweerd illustrates his
claim by pointing to the process of decomposition of the body after death.
The physical-chemical structures are 'liberated,' he says, and obey at that
time the laws of the physical-chemical aspect as such.66 He depicts the body
as a hierarchical series of structures, each higher structure embracing and
binding up within itself the lower ones, while the lower ones orient them-
selves to the principles of the higher functions. This depiction is streng-
thened through the almost implicit suggestion that the lower structures are
rather undifferentiated from the point of view of the higher structures. The
former obtain their specific human character only in the anticipation of the
latter.67 Thus, in spite of the idea of the concentration of functions, as an
62
 Ibidem, p 695. There is a difference then between enkapsis 'as such' and the enkaptic
structural whole, the latter expressing a real unity And there is also a difference between
the part-structures of an aggregate and the individuality structures of the enkaptic structural
whole, the former 'are functioning in' (p. 769), 'produced by' (p 774), 'taken up within' (p
775), 'realized within' (p. 775), 'obeying the form-laws' of the enkaptic structural whole, i.e
the cell, the living body.
63
 Ibidem, pp. 767, 777 In the case of the living body, it is the objective sensory image of
the materialized body which, simultaneously, gives 'objective' expression to the higher
structures, i.e. the sensorium and in a human body the act-structure. Perhaps Dooyeweerd
focusses so much on the sensory form-totality, the visible morphology of the body,
because of the fact that 'naive experience' immediately grasps the nature of a living body
(man or animal) and that in the case of the human being, one's character and intentions
become dearly manifest in one's visible verbal and non-verbal expressions.
^ Cf. Dooyeweerd's 32 propositions on man under the title, 'De leer van de mens in de
wijsbegeerte der wetsidee.' Solaßäe, 7(1954)nr. 2: "X. Het menselijk lichaam is opgebouwd
als een enkaptisch geheel in een viertal individualiteilsstructuren, waarvan telkens de lagere
in de hogere morfologisch gebonden zijn. De natuurlijke lichaamsvorm of lichaams-
gestalte is dus het knooppunt der vervlechtingen tussen de onderscheiden structuren..."
°' Ibidem, "XL Voor zover men de drie lagere structuren in haar interne ... eigenwettelijk-
heid vat buiten haar binding in de vierde of hoogste structuur, zijn zij nog niet als eigen-
lijke deelstructuren van het menselijk lichaam te verstaan. Eerst door haar successieve
binding in de vierde structuur worden zij tot wezenlijke onderdelen van het enkaptisch
siructuurgeheel, dat 'menslijk lichaam' heet."
66
 Ibidem, proposition XIII. Ouweneel follows Dooyeweerd on this point See Ouweneel,
De leer van de mem, p. 190, 193.
67
 This criticism is weakened by the fact that the act-structure also seems at times to em-
brace the concentration on the human I-ness, i.e. the directedness of all functions to the
unique spiritual act-centre. Cf ibidem, propositions XX, XXTV. Dooyeweerd's terminology
is slightly inconsistent, because in proposition XXII he explicitly states that the (supra-
temporal) spirit transcends all temporal functions, that is to say, it transcends the act-
structure. His term 'geestelijke uitdrukkingsvermogen,1 ie. of the human body and the act-
structure, is an attempt to bridge these two formulations.
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indication of the mystery of human personhood, the act-structure seems to
function as a hierarchical framework, binding up the lower structures within
itself and rendering these their specific human character.
This inconsistency seems, at first sight, to be of theoretical relevance only.
However, on closer consideration it proves to be of vital importance in
relation to the theory of emotion. Although it is bound up in the act-
structure, emotional expression as such cannot be qualified as an act. The
expression of emotions is usually absorbed, as it were, in acts with an supra-
psychic modal qualification, for example, socially or morally qualified acts. As
a matter of fact, emotional expression as such seems to presuppose, accord-
ing to Dooyeweerd, the temporary suspension of the guiding supra-psychic
normativity.68 An outburst of rage seems only conceivable as caused by a
temporary suspension of the ties of the act-structure. Dooyeweerd's theory
of the human body as an enkaptic structural whole at least suggests this rather
unattractive account of emotion.
My alternative to this account would be to defend that even emotional
outbursts are, in fact, responsive to the normative principles of the supra-
psychic modalities. It is rather artificial to isolate emotional expressions 'as
such' from the emotionally determined acts. Moreover, the psychic aspect of
these acts has a normativity of its own, drawn in analogical anticipation to
supra-psychic modalities. Even when persons seem to lack supra-psychic
subject functions, as may be the case in sleep, perhaps, or in severe psychi-
atric and somatic illness, this does not break the ties of the act-structure. The
fact that the supra-psychic aspects remain presupposed in the evaluation of
such conditions make clear that these ties are not really broken. They may
well be temporarily closed on the subjective side, from the normative side
they still function as the normative background against which the particular
behaviour of the person ough: to be evaluated. If not, then even in the case
of the most basic elementary emotional phenomena, not only the relational,
but above all the personal character of a subject's emotional expression must
be questioned. In Dooyeweerd's conception this question must indeed be
raised. He fails to account for the indisputable personal character of human
emotions, especially emotional outbursts.
Can justice be done to the emotions within any hierarchical ordered
conceptual framework? This question served as our guide in discussing
Aristotelian psychological and anthropological conceptions. Adherents of
the hierarchical model either tend to identify human destiny with life
dominated by the highest principle of the ladder of being, or as the case may
be, functioning (in Aristotle is it contemplation), or tend to substantialize
one of the functions. Closely connected with this choice is the problem of
conceptualizing the idea of human personhood. The Aristotelian doctrine
^ Ibidem, "XI naarmate de hoogste structuur l i j de l i j k in haar leidende rol in het struc-
tuurgeheel buiten werking treedt, zullen de lagere zich in haar eigenwettelijkheid ook naar
buiten openbaren (vgl bijv. de tijdelijke overheersing van de instinctieve levensdriften bij
tijdelijke terzijdestelling van alle redelijke overlegging)." For a similar criticism see J.
Dengerink, De zin van de werkelijkheid. Een wijsgerige benadering, Amsterdam: VU
Uitgeverij, 1986, pp 332-334 and also 256-259. Ouweneel, however, agrees with Dooye-
weerd, cp.cit, pp. 191, 211-217.
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stands up favourably against dualist conceptions, which are incapable of
accounting for the unity of the human person. Dooyeweerd's philosophy
contains the germs for a real alternative to any dualist or hierarchical con-
ception. However, his theory of the enkaptic structural whole, in its appli-
cation to anthropology in particular, needs to be revaluated and refined.69
^
9
 For an attempt along this line see my article "Emotie als struktuurprobleem. Een
onderzoek aan de hand van Dooyeweerds leer van het enkaptisch struktuurgeheel " Pbtlo-
sopbla reformata 54 (1989), 29-43
